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ABSTRACT: We analyse the redistributive power of the Spanish central government budget to
diminish regional disparities in per capita income in the 1991-1996 period. It firstly makes a brief
overview of the most relevant empirical studies carried out on this subject, analysing their
methodologies and results. Secondly, it estimates the redistributive power of the budgetary
policies of the Spanish central government. Its principal interest lies in the fact that the data base
used allows the redistributive effect of the main items of revenue and expenditure to be analysed,
whereas the majority of studies carried out limit the categories of expenditure to the case of
transfers. The results obtained are in line with those from other studies. The redistributive power
of the central budget is around 40%, expenditure being much more redistributive than revenue,
with the exception of individual income tax.
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21. Introduction
The purpose of this work is to analyse the redistributive effects that fiscal flows derived from the
Spanish central government budget cause at a regional level. As Eichengreen (1993) points out
and Bajo and Vegara later take up, starting with the budgetary policies of the public sector, we
can distinguish three effects: a) The equalisation or redistributive effect, that takes place because
of the fact that in the majority of countries the tax rates are proportional or progressive whereas,
at the same time, transfers and other government expenditure are made uniformly. It is, therefore,
supposed that regions with lower income levels systematically receive net transfers from the rest
of the regions. b) The stabilising effect, that consists in the fact that the tax revenues of the
central government decrease and expenditure and transfers increase when all the regions of the
State experience a recession simultaneously. c) The insurance effect, that consists in the fact that
net transfers from the central government increase when a region experiences a recession that
does not affect the rest of the regions.
This study is restricted, therefore, to the equalisation or redistributive effect. The redistributive
power of the Spanish central government budget in reducing regional disparities in per capita
income is examined. The paper is made up of four sections, this introduction being the first. The
second is a brief overview of the empirical work carried out on the subject of this study. In the
third section an estimation of the redistributive effects of the budget of the central government of
Spain is made, and in the fourth and last section the main conclusions are gathered together.
2. Regional redistribution of income through the central government budget. Studies
carried out
The persistence of significant regional disparities in income, as much within the areas of federal
as well as those of single-state countries, justifies the need for action by central governments to
try to correct or palliate these disparities through their budget. If there have been several works
that have approached this subject from a theoretical perspective, there have also been several that
3have empirically evaluated the level of regional redistribution carried out by the central
governments of various countries (see Table 1).
The pioneer study that approaches this subject is the MacDougall Report (1977), that analyses the
ability of the central governments of France, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the United States, to reduce regional disparities in
terms of income. This report used two indicators of redistribution: 'power of redistribution' and
the percentage variation in the Gini coefficient of concentration.
The 'power of redistribution' indicates the measure to which regional deviations in initial income
are reduced, deviation in income being understood as the difference between the per capita
regional index and the national average, which is taken as 100. Initial income is understood as
that existing before action by the public sector, and final income the result after that action. The
calculation of the 'power of redistribution' is carried out in two phases. In the first phase, the
elasticity-income of the regional public revenues or expenditure is determined. These coefficients
of elasticity are obtained through a regression where the taxes and expenditure related to the
various regions are the dependent variables and the initial income is the independent variable1.
All the variables are expressed as an index in relation to the average. So the equations to be
estimated are of the type:
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where,
I1 are the central government taxes levied on the citizens of the region in per capita terms.
                                                
1 This definition of elasticity does not correspond fully with the more classical definition, that requires a
log-lineal regression to be made between the two variables. Nevertheless, the results obtained in the two
cases only differ minimally. The coefficients of elasticity estimated by the MacDougall Report are
obtained under the constraint that the regression line passes through the point (100, 100), that is, the
national average.
4I is the average of central government taxes.
G1 is the expenditure of the central government in the region in per capita terms.
G is the average of central government expenditure.
Y1 is the initial income of the region in per capita terms.
Y is the national average initial income.
The elasticity thus obtained corresponds to the slope of the line of the regression. If this slope is
equal to 1, the tax or expenditure is neutral, which means that it varies from one region to another
in the same proportion as initial income. A tax in which the elasticity is above one is progressive,
while on the other hand, expenditure for which the elasticity is above one is regressive.
The second phase of the calculation of the 'power of redistribution' consists in multiplying the
deviation of the elasticity coefficient with respect to the neutral value (that is, one) by the
expression of the taxes or expenditure in percentages of initial income, as follows:
In the case of income:
(Elasticity-income of Ih -1) % 
omeInitialInc
Ih
In the case of expenditure:
(1- Elasticity-income of Gh) % 
omeInitialInc
Gh
where,
Ih is the category of income h.
Gh is the category of expenditure h.
The second indicator that the MacDougall Report uses is the variation of the Gini coefficient.
With this coefficient the degree of regional inequality in personal income is obtained, before all
redistribution. Afterwards the modified income is calculated, which is nothing more than initial
5income, less taxes and plus the expenditure made in each region. Finally, the variation in
percentage terms of the Gini index is calculated before and after the public activity considered.
The Report draws three significant conclusions. The first is the affirmation that regional
differences in income diminish strongly after the budgetary activity of the central government. In
fact, the Report estimates that, on average, public sector activity reduces regional differences by
some 40%, the single-state country budgets showing greater redistributive power than those of
federal states (46% in relation to 35%)2 . The second great conclusion is that the redistributive
effect of public expenditure is, in general, much greater than that of public revenue. The results
obtained state that, on average, the redistribution associated with public revenue is 5%, while that
connected with public expenditure reaches 35%. Thirdly, the Report shows the existence of an
inverse relation between the sign and the volume of the regional fiscal and trade balances.
These conclusions are contrasted with the case of Spain by Castells et al. (1981). This study
estimates that the redistributive power of central government revenue is situated at around 30%,
the redistributive power of public expenditure being around 22%, well above that of revenues,
estimated at 7%. The period of the study was limited to the year 1975.
After a long interval, various empirical studies appeared with great force in the nineties that,
because of the debate generated over whether the European Economic and Monetary Union does
or does not fulfil the requirements of an optimum monetary area3, took up the analysis of the
redistributive and stabilising power of the budgets of central governments. Although it was the
                                                
2 In fact, the redistributive power of central governments is estimated in the case of Germany to be 29%,
Australia 53%, Canada 32%, the United States 28%, and Switzerland 22% (in this case social security is
not included). With regard to the single-state countries, the results obtained were in the case of France
54%, Italy 47%, and the United Kingdom 36%.
3 According to the theory of optimum monetary areas, introduced by Mundell (1961), in order for
monetary union to function adequately no significant asymmetric regional disturbances should exist and
there should be high mobility of the factors of production. In the event that one of these conditions is not
fulfilled, it is necessary that a federal budget exists with sufficient stabilising capacity to confront possible
recessions at national as well as regional level.
6stabilising and insurance effects on which attention was centred4, the equalisation or
redistributive effect was present in the majority of the empirical studies due, in part, to the
difficulty of clearly separating these three types of effects.
The starting point of the empirical studies carried out in the nineties5 is the work carried out by
Sala-i-Martín and Sachs (1992). These authors grouped the states of the USA into 9 regions of
similar size to the countries of Europe and estimated the tax-income and transfers-income
elasticity for each of the regions and the period 1970-1988, by a regression similar to that used in
the MacDougall Report, although the analysis was made with time series and taking the variables
as logarithms. Therefore the regression to be estimated is of the type:
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where,
i refers to the regions.
US  is the whole of the United States.
X are the taxes6 (or transfers7) of the federation.
Y is the income.
M is a variable of time trends.
All the figures are taken in per capita real terms.
                                                
4 Authors such as Castells (1988) and Kauffmann and Laval (1999) consider that the insurance function is
part of the stabilising function.
5 A complete collection of these studies can be found in Bajo and Vegara (1999).
6 Federal taxes include personal income tax, contributions to social security, omitting corporate tax,
indirect taxes and taxes on foreign trade.
7 Only transfers to individuals and grants to states and local governments are considered as public
expenditure.
7Continuing from this the insurance effect of the federal budget in correcting regional asymmetric
disturbances is calculated as follows:
Tax insurance effect = 
^
tb Y
X t
Transfer insurance effect = 
^
gb  Y
X g
where,
^
tb is the income-elasticity of the taxes.
^
gb is the income-elasticity of the transfers.
Xt are the taxes collected.
Xg are the transfers.
The previous estimation allows it to be concluded that, in average terms, when a region
experiences an asymmetrical disturbance, its payments with regard to federal  taxes are reduced
by between 33 and 37 cents per dollar, while transfers increase by between 1 and 8 cents per
dollar.
Von Hagen (1992) criticised the methodology used by Sala-i-Martín and Sachs (1992), based on
estimations in levels, and argued that this methodology did not differentiate the insurance and
redistributive effects. Von Hagen (1992) carried out an estimation of the income elasticity of
taxes and transfers for the period 1981-1986 of the American federal government for the states of
the union though a model in ‘changes’, carrying out a regression for each year. According to this
author, the estimations in levels permit an idea to be obtained of how the American federal
system treats differences in real levels of income, but not of their variations in time. For this
reason the estimation of Sala-i-Martín and Sachs refers to the redistributive effect and not the
insurance effect.
8To overcome this restriction, Von Hagen put forward a regression of the type:
                                 ∆ ln  (Xi) = ait + bi  ∆ ln  (Yi) +  ui                                             (4)
where,
Xi are the taxes (or transfers) of the federal body in each region, in per capita terms.
Yi is the regional per capita income.
ait is the constant term variable each year.
ui is the random disturbance.
The results obtained by Von Hagen are much more limiting. In fact, the author estimates that the
capacity of the federal budget to absorb asymmetrical disturbances is located at some 10 cents per
dollar8. A possible explanation of such a low result could be the fact that Von Hagen only
analysed personal income tax when dealing with federal taxes.
Goodhart and Smith (1993) have repeated the focus of these two studies for the United States,
Canada and Great Britain, without obtaining significant differences between their estimations in
levels and in ‘changes’. The results obtained in levels in the case of the United States are closer to
those obtained by Von Hagen. The authors find that an increase of one dollar in the GDP of a
region means an increase of 13 cents in the federal income taxes collected and very few
variations in the level of federal expenditure. As far as the insurance capacity of the tax is
concerned, it is around 13%9. In the case of Canada, the insurance capacity of federal taxes as a
whole is 15%, while transfers to families or the total transfers do not show any considerable
insurance effects. As for the United Kingdom, this study only analyses income tax, obtaining an
insurance capacity of 21%.
                                                
8 Nevertheless, the fact that the variables are not relative to the national total could suggest that the
elasticity calculated gather both the insurance and the stabilising effect together.
9 Goodhart and Smith (1993) recognise that the differences between the results of their study and those of
Sala-i-Martín and Sachs could be due, in part, to the fact that the latter use a much broader variable when
considering taxes, whilst they only use personal income tax.
9Another type of estimation is that realised by departing from a macroeconomic model at a
regional level in which the effects of a disturbance are simulated. This procedure has been
followed to analyse the cases of the United States, Germany and France. The redistributive power
of the central government budget is estimated at some 17% in the case of the United States,
37.4% in France and between 33.5% and 42% in Germany (Pisani-Ferry, Italianer and Lescure
(1993)).
Of more relevance for our study is the work carried out by Bayoumi and Masson (1995) on the
United States10  and Canada11, in which it was attempted to clearly separate the redistributive
and the stabilising effects. The contrasting of the redistributive effect was done through the use of
a cross-section regression in which the relation between personal income before and after the
effects of the fiscal flows of the federal government was estimated, through Ordinary Least
Squares, taking the variables in terms of averages for the period 1969-1998 in the case of the
United States and for the period 1965-1988 in that of Canada. More precisely, the authors
estimated a regression of the following type:
(Y – TAX +TRAN)i /(Y-TAX+TRAN)s  =  a + b Yi/Y s + ei                                    (5)
where,
i refers to regional values (states in the case of the United States and provinces in that of Canada).
s refers to the national average.
Y is the per capita income before public sector activity.
TAX are taxes paid per capita.
TRANS are transfers (expenditure) of the federal government in per capita terms.
The difference between the coefficient ‘b’ and one represents the amount of redistribution caused
by fiscal flows.
                                                
10 Where a sample made up of 48 states was analysed.
11 With a sample of 10 provinces.
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More precisely, the authors analyse the redistributive effects of various categories of fiscal flows
in an accumulative way making four different regressions for initial income (Y), for which they
estimate the following four equations:
(Y – TAX)i /(Y-TAX)s  =  a + b Yi/Ys + ei                                            (6)
(Y – TAX +TRAN1)i /(Y-TAX+TRAN1)s =  a + b Yi/Ys + ei                                      (7)
(Y – TAX +TRAN2)i /(Y-TAX+TRAN2)s =  a + b Yi/Ys + ei                       (8)
(Y – TAX +TRAN3)i /(Y-TAX+TRAN3)s =  a + b Yi/Ys + ei                                      (9)
where,
TRAN1 are transfers proceeding from social security.
TRAN2 are transfers proceeding from social security and those of a personal nature.
TRAN3 are transfers proceeding from social security, those of a personal nature, and grants to
sub-central governments.
The results obtained through the equation (9) show the Canadian federal budget has a
redistributive capacity of 39%, which means that it is almost double that of the United States,
which is estimated at 22%. This significant difference is fundamentally due to federal transfers to
provincial and local governments, as while in Canada the redistributive power of this category of
expenditure is 22%, in the United States it is only 4%. Obviously, these estimations explain the
redistributive component that permeates the sub-central system of finance in Canada through
equalisation grants. As for the rest of the sections outlined, the difference in redistributive power
of federal taxes in one and the other country should be pointed out. Whilst in Canada they only
redistribute 2%, in the United States this percentage is around 7%.
To analyse the stabilisation effect, Bayoumi and Masson estimated the same equation, but
through an estimation in ‘changes’ for a series of years.
This same study has been reproduced for the cases of the United States, Canada, the United
Kingdom and France by Mélitz and Zumer (1998) applying, as well as the cross-section
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regression, an econometric estimation by panel to estimate the equation (8) proposed by Bayoumi
and Masson. The estimations obtained through the panel econometric technique show that
redistribution is substantially more significant in France and in the United Kingdom than in the
United States and Canada. In France, net transfers (revenue less public expenditure) proceeding
from the central government reduce 38% of the regional disparities in income, 26% in the United
Kingdom and around 18% and 16% in Canada and the United States respectively12.
Duboz and Nicot (1998) also apply the methodology proposed by Bayoumi and Masson to the
case of Germany with the purpose of analysing the measure to which the federal budget has
changed its degree of regional redistribution after unification. For this purpose the authors
estimate the relation existing between the regional income before central government activity and
the resulting income after its activity year after year for the period 1984-1995. The results
obtained show that the power of redistribution of the federal budget is around 40%, and that this
percentage has remained practically unchanged after the unification process in 1991.
Another alternative way to quantify the regional redistributive capacity of the public sector is that
carried out by Castells (1998). The author analysed the relation existing between the regional
fiscal balance and the relative situation of a region in terms of GDP in the cases of Spain, France,
Italy, Portugal, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, these countries
as a whole, and the European Union. In they latter case the redistributive power of the European
Union budget between the various countries of which it is composed was analysed.
More precisely, Castells estimated the following equation by Ordinary Least Squares on a cross-
section sample.
                                                SFi = a + b Yi + ei                                                                                (10)
where,
SFi is the regional fiscal balance with the central public sector (public expenditure - public
revenue) expressed as (1 + SFi / Yi) to avoid negative values.
                                                
12 The cross-section estimations produce almost identical results.
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Yi is the regional GDP per capita expressed as an index of the average for the corresponding
geographical area.
The results obtained through lineal and logarithmic regressions reveal the existence of a negative
relation between the fiscal balance and the per capita GDP of the various regions. This relation is
highly significant in all cases and the correlation coefficients obtained are high. The regression
coefficients obtained for the countries where all the central public sector budget13 was considered
are similar. In the logarithmic regression, where this coefficient represents elasticity, its value
was located between -0.42 and -0.48. This means that an increase in per capita regional GDP
(expressed as an index in relation to the average for the country) of 10% would be accompanied
by a worsening of the fiscal balance over GDP of around 4.5%.
Castells also related, through lineal and logarithmic regressions, the final per capita income of
each region, understood as initial income plus the regional fiscal balance with the central public
administration, with the initial per capita income. Both variables are expressed as an index in
relation to the average. The estimations thus obtained corroborate the results previously obtained.
The initial income-final income elasticity estimated is situated between 0.52 and 0.58 in the
countries where the social security is included and, on average, the redistributive power of the
central governments analysed is in the order of 45%.
Domenech, Maudes and Varela (1999) carried out an analysis similar to that made by Sala-i-
Martín and Sachs and Von Hagen to estimate the redistributive effects of the European Union
budget between member countries during the 1986-1997 period. More exactly, these authors
estimated the elasticity of different categories of community expenditure and revenue in relation
to the income of the member countries through a logarithmic regression. The estimation was
carried out on a pool of data where temporal dummy variables were included with the purpose of
simultaneously analysing how changes affect each region each year.
                                                
13 That is all the countries of the sample except for France and Germany, where social security was not
included.
13
The results obtained showed that the redistributive impact of the fiscal flows between the
member countries generated by the European Union budget was considerable, particularly given
the small size of this budget, and that this redistributive effect has tended to increase over time,
due basically to the effects of the structural and cohesion funds. The elasticity of per capita
community expenditure estimated in ecus in relation to per capita income is -0.23, which means a
certain degree of progressiveness, whereas revenues behave proportionally as the value of the
coefficient is very close to one.
3. Regional redistribution of income by the central government budget. Application to the
case of Spain
3.1. Methodology
The methodology employed in analysing the redistributive effects of the budget of the central
public administration is based on that used in the studies of Bayoumi and Masson (1995), Mélitz
and Zumer (1998) and Duboz and Nicot (1998). It consists in estimating the following equation
through cross-section regressions:
                                                       i
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where:
i is each of the different regions.
m is the average for the regions as a whole.
Y is the initial income, equivalent to income existing before the activity of the public sector. As
initial income, the Gross Added Value (GAV) at factor cost has been used, it being the most
primary magnitude of income there is.
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YF is the final income, equal to the initial income (Y) modified by the activity of the public
sector. To obtain the final income, revenue obtained by the public sector is subtracted from the
initial income and public expenditure is added.
The variables Y and YF are expressed in per capita terms and their values are the average for the
period considered, 1991-1996. The calculation of the averages was made in constant 1996 pesetas
in order to correct the effect of inflation.
The estimated value for the coefficient ‘b’ indicates the relation between the final income (YF)
and the initial income (Y) and it is interpreted in redistributive terms. So, for example, if its value
is 0.70, this indicates that 70% of the interregional differences in the level of initial per capita
income remain after public sector activity, and that this reduces 30% of every peseta of difference
between the regions. Therefore (1-b) represents the amount of income redistribution caused by
fiscal flows.
The estimation of equation (11) was carried out departing from various calculations of the final
income. They were the following:
• YF = Y + Regional Fiscal Balance with the Central Public Administration. In this case, the
value of (1-b) indicates the total redistributive power of the Central Public Administration.
• YF = Y – Public Revenue (distinguishing between the various typologies of revenues).  The
value (1-b) shows the redistributive power of public revenue as a whole and its different
categories.
• YF = Y + Public Expenditure (also distinguishing the larger categories of public expenditure).
The value (1-b) indicates the redistribution derived from total public expenditure and from its
main categories.
A methodological limitation of this analysis is that the magnitude of the initial income that is
used (GAV) includes the remuneration of the personnel of the public administration. Therefore it
is not possible to state that this indicator represents income before all action by the public sector.
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Nevertheless, to obtain an indicator of income more initial than this would be extremely
problematic.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the contribution of this analysis in relation to the studies
reviewed in the previous section consists in estimating the redistributive power of all the larger
categories of public expenditure, as it has territorially differentiated information available for all
of them. In contrast, the empirical studies mentioned are limited to expenditure on transfers,
either to individuals or sub-central governments.
3.2 Characteristics of the data base
The data relating to public revenue and expenditure, as well as fiscal balances, used in this study
have been taken from a previous study, carried out by the authors, in which fiscal flows derived
from the activity of the Central Public Administration in the various Autonomous Communities
or regions in the 1991-1996 period were quantified14 .
In the study mentioned, the territorial data for income and expenditure are a result of an
estimation of the territorial incidence of resources and expenditure of the Central Public
Administration. Specifically, the State, the Central Administration Organisations15 and the
Administration of the Social Security form part of the Central Public Administration.
The revenue are assigned territorially using relatively accepted existing methodology consisting
in adopting the hypotheses of tax incidence most suitable for each of the types of revenue and
then distributing the total between the various territories in accordance with the most appropriate
                                                
14 Castells, A.,  Barberán, R., Bosch, N., Espasa, M., Rodrigo, F. and Ruiz-Huerta, J. (2000): Las balanzas
fiscales de las Comunidades Autónomas. Análisis de los flujos fiscales de las Comunidades Autónomas
con la Administración Central (1991-1996), (The fiscal balances of the Autonomous Communities.
Analysis of the fiscal flows between the Autonomous Communities and the Central Administration (1991-
1996)), Ariel Economía & Fundació Carles Pi i Sunyer d’Estudis Autonòmics i Locals, Barcelona.
15 The Organisations of the Central Administration are made up of all the autonomous and assimilated
organisations that carry out administrative functions and depend upon the State. More exactly, all the
Autonomous Administrative Organisations, those Autonomous Commercial Organisations that are,
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statistical indicators for those hypotheses of incidence. This procedure is necessary due to the
possibility of ‘shifting’ the tax burden between individuals, which means that the collection of
taxes in a certain area does not necessarily correspond to the taxes paid by its residents.
The hypotheses of incidence of the tax burden established to assign the revenue of the Central
Public Administration territorially are those commonly used in the majority of theoretical and
empirical studies. So it is supposed that indirect taxes on consumption are passed through prices
to the final consumer, and therefore it will be them that support the tax burden. In personal taxes
it is supposed that transmission of the tax burden does not exist, for which reason these taxes fall,
basically, on the legally liable taxpayers. As far as business taxation is concerned, the uncertainty
of their final incidence leads to the formulation of alternative hypotheses, it being considered that
these can be passed to the factors of production, in the form of lower factor payments, and also
towards consumers in the form of higher prices.
The territorial assignation of the expenditure showed itself to be much more complex as all public
expenditure, in as far as it is directed towards the production of services for their public
provision, produces two types of different effects. On the one hand, public expenditure finances
services that are provided to consumers without compensation and, on the other hand, it makes
payments to acquire the resources necessary (labour, supplies, equipment, installations, etc.) to
produce these public services. The first is a unilateral effect, without compensation, typical of the
public sector. The second is a bilateral effect, with compensation, as the recipients of the
payments always deliver something in exchange.
Consequently, studies of territorial aspects of expenditure can be focused upon taking the
geographical location of the expenditure as a reference or the place of residence of the individuals
that benefit from the service provided. The first one is the so called flow approach, and the
second one is the determining benefit approach.
                                                                                                                                                             
because of their budgetary structure and their activity, much closer to the public sector than the private,
some public bodies, and Universities with state-wide responsibilities.
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The usual practice in the territorial assignation of expenditure according to the flow approach
consists in attributing the public expenditure to the region in which the expenditure materialises,
that is where the personnel, the use of current goods and services, the receipt of the transfers and
the investments are located. This was the criteria adopted, which means that we gave the flow
approach a sense of 'reality' as against the alternative of giving it a sense of ‘cash flows’, which
would lead us to attribute the public expenditure to the region in which the Administration makes
payment. In the case of remuneration of personnel the two versions of the flow approach
practically coincide. But the results could be very different in the other sections of the budget.
Consequently the purchase of current goods and services are ascribed to the region in which they
are used and not in the region where they are acquired, investments in the region where they
materialise, and transfers in the region where their final recipients reside.
The territorial assignation of public expenditure following the previous approach can be
relatively easy or direct in as far as there is a system of accounting that allows all categories of
expenditure to be regionalised. If not, it is necessary to establish hypotheses about the territory
where this expenditure is made.
According to the benefit approach, the assignation of the expenditure is made to the community
where the beneficiary resides, independently of where the public service is produced or the
investment is made. In this case, it is also necessary to establish hypotheses about the situation of
the beneficiaries and about the quantification of the benefits that the goods and services provide
to the beneficiaries.
The territorial assignation of expenditure can differ considerably according to one or another
approach, especially in those pure public goods or services of a national scope, that is those that
have an indivisible character and produce external effects that reach the population as a whole,
such as defence, justice, foreign affairs, public order, public health, basic research and general
administration. In this case, the most used statistical indicator in carrying out territorial
assignation according to the benefit approach is the population of each region, given that the
provision of these goods benefits all citizens. On the other hand, according to the flow approach,
18
this expenditure is attributed to the region in which it materialises. Madrid is the area that gathers
the greater part of this type of expenditure because it is the capital.
When dealing with public goods of local scope, that is expenditure that produces benefits that
extend to the local or regional environment in which they are provided (e.g. cultural and sporting
facilities, urban and transport infrastructures), the territorial assignation of public expenditure
according to the benefit approach attributes, to a large extent, in relation to the pattern resulting
from their distribution according to the flow approach, as it is considered that the citizens resident
in the region where the facilities or infrastructures are located are those that have greater access
to them and, therefore, greater possibility of enjoying them. Nevertheless, in all these types of
expenditure, the possible spillover effects generated by the rest of the regions are considered.
As far as that public expenditure with rival and excludability characteristics, the assignation of
the expenditure according to one or another approach greatly coincides. Within this category of
expenditure can be found the payments of the Social Security to individuals and grants to sub-
central governments.
Finally, the regional distribution of public expenditure that finances the provision of semi-private
goods, such as education, health, and applied research, is distributed according to the benefit
approach partly following the pattern resulting from the flow approach and partly in relation to
the external effects that the provision of these goods generates.
It was considered to be advantageous in this study to carry out the redistributive analysis of
public expenditure differentiating these two approaches of its territorial assignation with the
purpose of bringing into contrast the redistributive implications that the use of one or another can
contain. In spite of this we are aware that from the perspective of the redistributive effect of fiscal
flows the most suitable focus is that of the benefit approach, whilst the flow approach is better
adapted to the insurance effect.
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3.3. Estimation and results
3.3.1. Global redistributive power of the Central Public Administration
Equation (11) was estimated calculating the final income as that resulting from of the global
activity of the public sector, that is:
YF = Y + Regional Fiscal Balance
The regional fiscal balance was obtained from the difference between the expenditure made
(entry of resources) and the income obtained (exit of resources) by the Central Public
Administration in each of the regions. Therefore, the fiscal balance gathers the territorial effects
of the global activity of the public sector.
Table 2a shows the results of the estimation using the two approaches of territorial assignation of
public expenditure and from all the regions covered by the Spanish State (the 17 Autonomous
Communities together with the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, both being dealt with
together). The coefficient ‘b’ almost presents the same value in both cases: 0.6432 when we
calculate the fiscal balance according to the flow approach and 0.6461 when we calculate
according to the benefit approach. As a consequence, the fiscal flows derived from the activity of
the Spanish Central Public Administration reduce the interregional differences existing in the
level of initial income per inhabitant by 35%-36%
With regard to the estimated value of the coefficient ‘b’ from the two approaches of territorial
assignation of expenditure, because of the characteristics of each this  should be smaller in the
case of the benefit approach. Nevertheless, the estimated value is almost the same in both cases.
This is due to the effect of Ceuta and Melilla that present a fiscal balance that is much higher
from the flow approach (410,482 pesetas/inhabitant on average in the 1991-1996 period) than
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from the benefit approach (197,428 pesetas/inhabitant)16. If these territories are excluded from
the estimation, the coefficient ‘b’ adopts more differentiated values when dealing with one or the
other approach of territorial assignation of expenditure: 0.6845 from the flow approach and
0.6542 from the benefit approach (Table 2b). It can therefore be seen that the redistributive power
of the public sector is higher when we assign the expenditure territorially according to the benefit
approach.
Finally, the global redistributive power of the public sector has also been estimated excluding the
'foral' Autonomous Communities or regions, as well as the autonomous cities of Ceuta and
Melilla, because of their particular system of finance17. Taking only the 15 Autonomous
Communities under the common system into account the redistributive power of the Central
Public Administration increases, as well as the difference in the value of the coefficient ‘b’
obtained according to one or another approach of territorial assignation of public expenditure.
The value for ‘b’ is now 0.6756 according to the flow approach and 0.6187 according to that of
benefit approach, which means a redistributive capacity of the Central Public Administration that
oscillates between 32.44% and 38.13% (Table 2c).
3.3.2. The redistributive power of public revenue
The estimations in Table 3 calculate the redistributive effect of public revenue as a whole, and the
various typologies of tax individually. Therefore, the final income is determined as follows:
                                                
16 Significant military expenditure is made in these territories. From the flow approach all this
expenditure is assigned to them. Alternatively, in the case of the benefit approach, expenditure on defence
is territorially assigned according to population. This means that the fiscal balance is greater in the case of
the flow approach focus than in that of benefit approach.
17The ‘foral’ system is applicable to the regions (Basque Country and Navarra) which have historical
charters on fiscal and economic matters (‘fueros’ or privileges). The ‘foral’ system is based on the transfer
of revenue and the management of State taxes to these regions, as well as certain regulatory powers with
regard to these State taxes. An annual quota is paid by these regions to the central government for the
financing of general obligations of the State. In principle, the 'foral' system of finance should not influence
the size of the regional fiscal balance, in as far as the contribution of these territories to the central
government through their quota compensates for the reduced taxation powers of the State in these
territories. Nevertheless, if this contribution is undervalued the magnitude and sign of the balance could be
affected.
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YF = Y – Public Revenue
Nevertheless, it has not been possible to do the estimations including all the regions of the State
of Spain, due to the particular fiscal agreements that some of them have: the Basque Country and
Navarre, due to their 'foral' nature, and the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla because of their
especial indirect taxation system. In fact we decided to exclude the Basque Country, Navarre,
Ceuta and Melilla from all the estimations, and the Canary Islands when we estimate the
redistributive effect of indirect taxes and total revenue.
The redistributive effect of total revenue18 is very small, the value of ‘b’ is 0.9739 and, therefore,
its redistributive power is 2.61%. Distinguishing between types of taxes, it can be said that direct
taxes19 have the greatest redistributive power (6%) (b=0.9400), mainly personal income tax
(13.56%). On the other hand, the indirect taxes20 as a whole do not reduce interregional
differences in income, but rather their effect is in the opposite direction as they present a value
above one for the coefficient ‘b’ (1.0275). Nevertheless, in the case of VAT, the coefficient ‘b’
has a value of 0.9271, and therefore the tax presents a redistributive power of 7.29%. Social
contributions21 to the Social Security, the same as with indirect taxes as a whole, present a value
above one for the coefficient ‘b’ (1.0166), and as a consequence are without a redistributive
effect favourable to the reduction of inter-territorial differences in income. Therefore, although
direct taxes have redistributive capacity, the weight of indirect taxes and social contributions
mean that when the redistributive power of the totality of public revenue is analysed, it is small.
                                                
18 The revenue considered is the whole of direct, indirect taxes, social security contributions, some fees
and current as well as capital transfers that proceed from the rest of the public administrations or the
private sector. Excluded therefore are financial revenue, property income and transfers made between
various agents for reasons of consolidation.
19 As well as personal income tax, the direct taxes include corporate tax, property tax and inheritance and
gift tax. The latter two are of a very residual nature.
20 The indirect taxes considered are VAT, excise taxes, taxes on foreign trade, taxes on wealth tranfers
and stamp duties, and rates imposed on sugar and isoglucose.
21 This includes the Social Security contributions of employers, salaried workers, of the self-employed,
the unemployed and the State.
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3.3.3. The redistributive power of public expenditure
Tables 4 and 5 show the redistributive power of the whole of public expenditure and its main
categories, using the flow approach and the benefit approach respectively. In their calculation, the
estimation of equation (11) was carried out obtaining the final income as follows:
YF = Y + Public expenditure
Similarly, the estimation was made for the whole of the Autonomous Communities in the
common system. The 'foral' systems were excluded, as their particular system of finance affects
the level of direct expenditure that the State makes in these territories22. The autonomous cities
of Ceuta and Melilla were excluded as they present a quite different structure of expenditure from
the rest of the regions.
The redistributive power of the total expenditure23 of the Central Public Administration is
22.34% (b=0.7766) when it is assigned territorially according to the flow approach, and 26.63%
(b=0.7337) when this is done according to the benefit approach.
If we distinguish between the larger categories of expenditure, the values of the coefficient ‘b’ do
not vary much between one or another approach of the territorial assignment of expenditure, with
the exception of expenditure on pure public goods. This is due to the fact that for the majority of
the categories of expenditure analysed, the assignation criteria do not differ between the two
approaches by very much, as was shown in the previous section.
The expenditure with the greatest redistributive capacity (around 10%) is that made on Social
Security (payments to individuals made by the Administrative Organisations of the Social
                                                
22 More precisely, because of the different system of financing the health service.
23 The public expenditure considered is the expenditure to produce goods and services not for sale and for
the redistribution of wealth or income, remaining outside the area of the study financial costs, and those
deriving from interest payments, the consumption of fixed capital and consolidation transfers.
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Security system24 and the National Employment Services, INEM) and expenditure with regard to
grants to sub-central governments. Due to the varying ceiling on responsibilities existing between
the Autonomous Communities under Article 151 and those under Article 143 of the
Constitution25, in order to obtain the redistributive effect of the sub-central grants we have had to
group the expenditure in this area together with that on education, as the first to exercise this
responsibility included the resources necessary to finance it within the grants received from the
State. The redistributive power of this group of expenditure is 10%. Nevertheless, to also obtain
the redistributive power of expenditure on education individually, we have made an analysis
grouping only those Autonomous Communities under Article 143 (Table 6), as it is the part of
the State territory where the State provides this service directly. The redistributive capacity of
expenditure on education is around 4%. Similarly, grants to the sub-central governments of the
Autonomous Communities under Article 143 have a redistributive power of 7% (Table 6). On the
other hand, grants to sub-central governments of the Autonomous Communities under Article
151, that include resources for the financing of education decentralised to these regions, has a
greater redistributive capacity, 10% (Table 7), equal to that obtained when carrying out the
analysis for the whole of the Autonomous Communities under the common system grouping
together expenditure on education and grants.
Of the other categories of expenditure analysed, those that stand out because of their
redistributive effects are expenditure on health services and on pure public goods, that bring
together the expenditure on general services of the Public Administration26, the defence services
                                                
24 Among which are expenditure on pensions, benefits for temporary disability and other economic
benefits, and the administration and general services of these economic benefits.
25 Regarding the responsibilities assigned to the Autonomous Communities, we should distinguish
between two types of Communities, depending on the access route taken towards autonomy, which may
be either the route indicated by Article 143 of the Constitution or Article 151. The fundamental difference
between them, as far as the level of responsibilities and expenditure is concerned, is that route provided by
Article 143 involves  access to common responsibilities only, and excludes two fundamental functions, i.e.
health and education, which account for a large volume of expenditure.
26 Within this group of functions there are four large blocks of programmes: those corresponding to
higher executive, legislative and judicial bodies, those connected with economic and budgetary policy,
those related to foreign affairs and those related to the organisations of the judiciary, as well as the Central
Administration, that carry out activities that could fall within these blocks of programmes.
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and the public order and security services. The redistributive power of the first is 5%. In the case
of the second it is necessary to distinguish between the two approaches of the territorial
assignation of expenditure, as the results are clearly different. Using the flow approach, the value
of the coefficient ‘b’ is 1.0165, therefore it does not contribute to the reduction of territorial
differences in per capita income, its effect is rather more the opposite. On the other hand, the
expenditure on pure public goods, if territorially assigned according to the benefit approach, has a
redistributive power of 4% (0.9630).
Finally, the analysis made found no redistributive capacity for expenditure on housing or culture,
as the values of the coefficient b are around one, nor for expenditure on infrastructures under the
benefit approach. The latter, on the other hand, has a slight redistributive effect (2%) when its
territorial assignation is made according to the flow approach.
4. Conclusions
In this study the power of the Spanish Central Public Administration to diminish territorial
disparities in per capita income between the various Spanish regions through budget policy has
been analysed. For this purpose the relation present between initial income, understood as that
existing before the activity of the public sector, and the final income, understood as that resulting
after the activity of the public sector through its revenue and expenditure policies, was
determined by the use of a lineal regression.
The work of MacDougall (1977) was pioneer in this type of analysis and has been followed in a
series of contributions, especially from the nineties onwards, that have been outlined in this
study. The methodology used for the analysis carried out here is based, therefore, on that
frequently used in the contributions mentioned.
From the estimations realised the global distributive power of the Central Public Administration
is obtained. This, resulting from its activity in the whole of revenue as well as expenditure
policies, is 36%. This means that 64% of the interregional differences in per capita income
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remain after the activity of the public sector, and they are reduced by 36%. If this same analysis
is carried out for the group of the Autonomous Communities under the common system only,
excluding the 'foral' systems and the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, the redistributive
power oscillates between 32% and 38%, according to whether the territorial assignation of
expenditure is done under the flow approach or the benefit approach. The first approach assigns
the expenditure to the region where the expenditure materialises, the second to the region where
the beneficiary is located.
As regards taxes, the results show that the most redistributive are direct taxes, with a capacity of
6%, and especially personal income tax (13.56%). On the other hand, the redistributive power of
social contributions and indirect taxes is null, even though when VAT is analysed separately it
presents a redistributive effect of 7.29%. All in all, the redistributive power of the whole of
revenues is low, at 2.61%, due to the fact that the effects of indirect taxes and the social
contributions compensate for that of direct taxes.
The results show that public expenditure as a whole has much more redistributive power than
revenues, with values that oscillate between 22.34% and 26.63% according to whether we adopt
the flow approach or the benefit approach for the territorial assignation of expenditure. The
redistributive capacity of the main categories is as follows: social security (10%), grants to sub-
central governments in Autonomous Communities under Article 151 (10%), grants to sub-central
governments in Autonomous Communities under Article 143 (7%), health services (5%),
education (4%), pure public goods (4%), infrastructures (2%). On the other hand expenditure on
housing and culture has no redistributive power.
The results obtained do not differ to any great extent from those obtained in preceding work
carried out for other periods and in other countries. Two broad conclusions may be arrived at.
The first is that the redistributive power of the central government budget is considerable (around
40%). The second is that the redistributive capacity of public expenditure is much greater than
that of revenues, even though that of personal income tax is considerable. Redistribution through
expenditure is achieved fundamentally through social security payments and transfers to sub-
central governments.
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Table 1: Empirical studies on the level of regional redistribution of budgetary policies of central governments
AUTHOR SAMPLE METHOD RESULTS
MacDougall
(1977)
Germany (figures for 1970 and 1973)
Switzerland (1967)
Australia (figures for 1971-72 and
1973-74)
Canada (figures for 1969, 1973, and
1973-74)
USA (Average 1969-71, 1972 and
1974)
France (figures for 1969 and 1970)
Italy (1973)
United Kingdom (1964)
The 'redistributive power' is measured from the estimation of the
coefficients of elasticity of the regional public revenues and
expenditure in relation to the initial income, understood as that exiting
before action by the public sector. These coefficients are obtained by a
regression calculus where the revenues and expenditure are the
dependent variables and the initial income is the independent variable.
All the figures are in per capita terms.
The redistributive power is calculated by multiplying the deviation of
the coefficient of elasticity with respect to one by the percentage of
initial income that taxes or expenditure represent.
The GINI coefficient of variation is also used.
On average, the redistributive power of the
public sector is estimated as 40%, the
redistributive effect of public expenditure being
35% while that associated with revenue is only
5%.
Castells et al.
(1981)
Spain (1975) As for MacDougall (1977)
The redistributive power of the central
Government is around 30%, the redistributive
power of expenditure being 22% and that of
revenue 7%.
Sala-i-Martín
and Sachs
(1992)
United States (grouping the American
States into 9 large regions) (1970-88
period)
The taxation-income and transfer-income elasticities are estimated for
each of the regions, using logarithms. That is an regression equation is
made in which the dependent variable is the percentage of regional
revenue or expenditure with respect to the national total and the
independent variable is the percentage of initial income in relation to
the national income. All the variables are in per capita terms. The
insurance effect is calculated from the income elasticity.
The insurance power of the Federal Government
of the United States is around 40%. Taxes
present the greatest power, being estimated at
33%-37%, whilst that of public expenditure is on
average 1%-8%.
Von Hagen
(1992)
United States (51 states) (1981-86
period)
The same model as that of Sala-i-Martín and Sachs is estimated, but in
‘changes’ and making a regression not for every region but for every
year. The variables for public revenue and  expenditure as well as for
income are not relative to the national total. They only considered
personal income tax as federal tax.
The stabilising-insurance effect of the federal
fiscal system of the United States is estimated to
be 10%.
Goodhar and
Smith
(1993)
United States (44 states) (1981-86)
Canada (11 provinces) (1965-88)
United Kingdom (11 regions) (1983-
87)
Repeats the focus of the work of Sala-i-Martín and Sachs and that of
Von Hagen, but in these three countries. The estimations are made in
levels and in ‘changes’. As regards public revenue, in the case of the
United States and the United Kingdom only personal income tax is
considered.
In the United States personal income tax has an
insurance power of 13%, whilst in the United
Kingdom it is 21%. In Canada, the insurance
effects of federal taxes as a whole reaches 15%.
The transfers analysed, in the case of the United
States as well as Canada, do not present
considerable insurance effects.
Pisani-Ferry,
Italianer  and
Lescure
(1993)
United States
Germany
France
Estimation of a regional macroeconomic model.
The insurance power of the central government
budget is estimated as 17% in the case of the
United States, at 37% in France and at 38% in
Germany.
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Cont. Table 1
AUTHOR SAMPLE METHOD RESULTS
Bayoumi and
Masson
(1993)
United States (48 states) (1969-86)
Canada (10 provinces) (1965-88)
Outline the redistributive function of central government through a
cross-section regression in which the relation between personal
income before (independent variable) and after public sector activity
(dependent variable) is estimated. These variables are taken in average
terms for the period, per capita and related to the national average.
The federal budget of Canada has a redistributive
power of 39%, whilst that of the United States is
22%.
Mélitz and
Zummer
(1998)
United States (48 states) (1960-94)
Canada (10 provinces) (1965-88)
France (21 regions) (1973-89)
United Kingdom (12 regions) (1971-
93)
Repeats the work of Bayoumi and Masson, but as well as the cross-
section analysis carry out a panel econometric analysis.
The redistributive power of the central
government is substantially more significant  in
France (38%) and the United Kingdom (26%)
than in the United States (16%) and Canada
(18%).
Duboz and
Nicot
(1998)
Germany (1984-95)
1984-90 for the 11 länder)
(1991-95 for the 11 and the 16 länder)
Apply the method proposed by Bayoumi and Masson, estimating the
relation that there is between the regional income before the activity of
the central government and the income resulting after its activity, year
after year.
The degree of redistribution carried out by the
federal government is in the order of 40%. This
level of redistribution remained practically
unchanged after the unification process.
Castells
(1998)
Spain
France
Italy
Portugal
Germany
Sweden
European Union
The author estimates, on the one hand, the relation existing between
the fiscal balance and the relative situation of a region in terms of
GDP. On the other hand, the author estimates the relation between the
final per capita income of each region (that is after the activity of the
central public administration) and the initial per capita income. The
estimations in every case are made through lineal and logarithmic
regressions.
In the logarithmic regression, where the
coefficient represents the elasticity of the fiscal
balance with regard to GDP, this is in the order
of 0.45 on average. This means that an increase
of 100% in the GDP would be accompanied by a
worsening of the fiscal balance over the GDP of
45%.
In the second estimation the result obtained was
that the redistributive power of the central
governments is around 45%.
Domenech,
Maudes and
Varela
(1999)
European Union (1986-97)
Carry out an econometric estimation similar to that made by Von
Hagen and Sala-i-Martín and Sachs, in which is estimated the
elasticity of the various categories of community revenue and
expenditure in relation to the income of the member countries through
a logarithmic regression on a pool of data in which dummy time
variables are included.
The elasticity of community per capita
expenditure estimated in ecus with regard to the
per capita income is -0.23, which means a certain
progressiveness. The revenues are shown to be
proportional. The value of their coefficient is
very close to one.
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Table 2a
INCOME BEFORE AND AFTER THE ACTIVITY OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (I)
(Sample: all the Autonomous Communities and Ceuta y Melilla) (18 observations)
Dependent variable:  Final income (YF)  Constant Coefficient ‘b’ of
the explanatory
variable: Initial
income (Y)
 R2  F Redistributive
power:  1-b
Fiscal balance
 Flow approach
Y- Total revenue + total expenditure 0.3734
(5.164)***
0.6432
(9.039)***
0.83625 81.710 0.3568
Fiscal balance
Benefit approach
Y- Total revenue + total expenditure 0.3738
(7.954)***
0.6461
(13.968)***
0.92421 195.102 0.3539
Table 2b
INCOME BEFORE AND AFTER THE ACTIVITY OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (I)
(Sample: all the Autonomous Communities) (17 observations)
Dependent variable:  Final income (YF)  Constant Coefficient ‘b’ of
the explanatory
variable: Initial
income (Y)
 R2  F Redistributive
power:  1-b
Fiscal balance
 Flow approach
Y- Total revenue + total expenditure 0.3226
(7.162)***
0.6845
(15.553)***
0.94161 241.888 0.3155
Fiscal balance
Benefit approach
Y- Total revenue + total expenditure 0.3639
(7.549)***
0.6542
(13.889)***
0.9279 192.915 0.3458
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Table 2c
INCOME BEFORE AND AFTER THE ACTIVITY OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (I)
(Sample: all the Autonomous Communities under the common system) (15 observations)
Dependent variable:  Final income (YF)  Constant Coefficient ‘b’ of
the explanatory
variable: Initial
income (Y)
R2  F Redistributive
power:  1-b
Fiscal balance
 Flow approach
Y- Total revenue + total expenditure 0.3318
(6.392)***
0.6756
 (13.144)***
0.93002 172.766 0.3244
Fiscal balance
Benefit approach
Y- Total revenue + total expenditure 0.3986
(7.873)***
0.6187
(12.342)***
0.92137 152.334 0.3813
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Table 3
INCOME BEFORE AND AFTER THE ACTIVITY OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (II)
(Sample: Autonomous Communities under the common system) (15 observations)
Dependent variable:  Final income (YF)  Constant Coefficient ‘b’ of
the explanatory
variable: Initial
income (Y)
R2  F Redistributive
power:  1-b
Y- Total revenue (1) 0.0365
(0.795)
0.9739
 (21.421)***
0.97451 458.843 0.0261
Y- Direct taxes 0.0674
(2.394)**
0.9400
(33.722)***
0.98870 1137.183 0.0600
Y - Personal income tax 0.0924
(0.695)
0.8644
(6.562)***
0.76813 43.065 0.1356
Y- Social contributions -0.0160
(-2.292)**
1.0166
(147.475)***
0.99940 21748.865 -0.0166
Y- Indirect taxes (1) -0.0274
 (-4.637)***
1.0275
(176.192)***
0.99961 31043.618 -0.0275
Revenue
Y  VAT (1) 0.0403
(0.431)
0.9271
 (10.028)***
0.89339 100.600 0.0729
(1) The Canary Islands are excluded as they have an indirect tax system different from the rest of the Autonomous Communities.
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Table 4
INCOME BEFORE AND AFTER THE ACTIVITY OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (III)
(Sample: Autonomous Communities under the common system) (15 observations)
Dependent variable:  Final income (YF)  Constant Coefficient ‘b’ of
the explanatory
variable: Initial
income (Y)
R2  F Redistributive
power:  1-b
Y + Total expenditure 0.2226
(3.967)***
0.7766
 (13.980)***
0.93763 195.427 0.2234
Y + Expenditure en Social Security (1) 0.1036
(3.466)***
0.8980
(30.337)***
0.98607 920.335 0.1020
Y + Expenditure on Health 0.0430
(6.589)***
0.9550
(147.800)***
0.99941 21844.800 0.0450
Y + Expenditure on Housing 0.0017
(1.087)
0.9984
(632.846)***
0.99997 400493.451 0.0006
Y + Expenditure on Culture -0.0024
(-1.041)
1.0020
(445.258)***
0.99993 198254.719 -0.0020
Y + Expenditure on Education + Grants
to Sub-central governments
0.1029
(9.293)***
0.8975
(81.899)***
0.99807 6707.45943 0.1025
Y + Expenditure on Pure Public Goods
(2)
-0.0208
(-0.697)
1.0165
(34.463)***
0.98917 1187.690 0.0165
Expenditure
Flow approach
Y + Expenditure on Infrastructures 0.0209
(2.160)**
0.9795
(102.387)***
0.99876 10483.136 0.0205
(1) Includes expenditure on payments to individuals.
(2) Includes the following functional groups of expenditure: general services of the Public Administration, defence services and public
order and security services.
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Table 5
INCOME BEFORE AND AFTER THE ACTIVITY OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (IV)
(Sample: Autonomous Communities under the common system) (15 observations)
Dependent variable:  Final income (YF)  Constant Coefficient ‘b’ of
the explanatory
variable: Initial
income (Y)
R2  F Redistributive
power:  1-b
Y + Total expenditure 0.2729
(6,234)***
0.7337
(16,928)***
0.95660 286.567 0.2663
Y + Expenditure en Social Security (1) 0.1042
(3.472)***
0.8975
(30.201)***
0.98595 912.118 0.1025
Y + Expenditure on Health 0.0488
(9.023)***
0.9498
(177.386)***
0.99959 31465.634 0.0502
Y + Expenditure on Housing 0.0020
(1.282)
0.9982
(661.117)***
0.99997 437075.185 0.0008
Y + Expenditure on Culture -0.0004
(-0.331)
1.0003
(824.450)***
0.99998 679718.179 -0.0003
Y + Expenditure on Education + Grants
to Sub-central governments
0.1053
(9.629)***
0.8957
(82.698)***
0.99810 6838.972 0.1043
Y + Expenditure on Pure Public Goods
(2)
0.0372
(16.520)***
0.9630
(432.041)***
0.99993 186659.186 0.0370
Expenditure
Benefit approach
Y + Expenditure on Infrastructures 0.0099
(1.103)
0.9913
(111.819)***
0.99896 12503.404 0.0087
(1) Includes expenditure on payments to individuals.
(2) Includes the following functional groups of expenditure: general services of the Public Administration, defence services and public
order and security services.
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Table 6
INCOME BEFORE AND AFTER THE ACTIVITY OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (V)
(Sample: Autonomous Communities under the common system. Article 143) (10 observations)
Dependent variable:  Final income (YF)  Constant Coefficient ‘b’ of
the explanatory
variable: Initial
income (Y)
R2  F Redistributive
power:  1-b
Y + Expenditure on Education 0.0391
(6.124)***
0.9593
(146.426)***
0.99963 21440.615 0.0407
Y + Sub-central Financing 0.0700
(5.518)***
0.9288
(71.291)***
0.99843 5082.351 0.0712
Expenditure
Flow Approach
Y + Expenditure on Education + Grants
to Sub-central Governments
0.1052
(7.978)***
0.8920
 (65.851)***
0.99816 4336.306 0.1080
Y + Expenditure on Education 0.0432
(10.068)***
0.9559
(216.797)***
0.99983 47001.103 0.0441
Y + Sub-central Financing 0.0700
(5.518)***
0.9288
 (71.291)***
0.99843 5082.351 0.0712
Expenditure
Benefit approach
Y + Expenditure on Education + Grants
to Sub-central Governments
0.1093
(8.955)***
0.8887
(70.935)***
0.99841 5031.718 0.1113
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Table 7
INCOME BEFORE AND AFTER THE ACTIVITY OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (VI)
(Sample: Autonomous Communities under the common system. Article 151) (5 observations)
Dependent variable:  Final income (YF)  Constant Coefficient ‘b’ of
the explanatory
variable: Initial
income (Y)
R2  F Redistributive
power:  1-b
Flow approach and
benefit approach
Y + Grants to Sub-central Governments 0.9973
(5.003)**
0.9009
(45.563)***
0.99856 2075.960 0.0991
